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In spring 2000 the Center for European Political Studies introduced the Caucasus 
stability pact project, which was presented as to the South Caucasus leaders, 
international organizations (e.g., OSCE) and different conferences, as well as to a wider 
public discussions, as it was placed in the Center’s web-cite (www.ceps.be).  
 
The aim of our research is the utmost concentration on its flaws in comparison with the 
other initiatives and already operating similar international regimes.  
 
Unlike the reported political diplomatic debates of 2000 the version suggested by CEPS 
is positioned in a public domain. Therefore, it is considered to be the second, public 
track of this significant initiative and is destined to assist the search of stability model 
by the South Caucasus leaders, thus giving it more democratic spirit and creating a 
softening the atmosphere and allowing to involve in this process the academics and 
NGOs as well.  
 
Let’s observe the positions of the actors involved in and try to compare them:  
 
Approaches of Armenia  
 
The President of Armenia Robert Kocharian referred to this subject in his speech 
delivered at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, November 19, 1999:  
 
The Caucasus has always been an utterly complex and explosive region due to its ethnic 
complexities, religious diversity, severe historical past and the multiplicity of 
overlapping interests. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the adjustments to 
new realities continue to take place. The present treaty on Conventional Forces in 
Europe does not appear to be sufficient in resolving the existing security problems in 
our sensitive and complex region. It is therefore necessary to devise a regional security 
system for the South Caucasus, in the wider system of pan European security, which 
will engage all the parties concerned and primarily those in the region itself. Today, it 
is our collective challenge to transform the Caucasus from a region of conflicting 
armies and senseless terrorism to an economic crossroad of peace and prosperity.  
 
Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan has constantly referred to the essence of 
this basic problem. Thus far on March 15, 1999 at the Royal Institute of International 
affaires at Chatham House, London, referring to the existing challenges in the Region, 
the Minister said:  
... In addition, there is the absence of an all-encompassing regional organization that 
includes all the countries in the region, particularly the major ones that can enable us 
to discuss our issues and work on consensus building. This will certainly help promote 
the stability in the region.  
 
Neither CIS, nor OSE, nor BSEC, nor ECO provide a venue of a general forum for all 
the major actors in the Region to discuss the existing vital problems. The scheme 
suggested by Armenia comprises all the countries having a significant role and 
influence in the South Caucasus region.  
 
In his Address to the Georgian Parliament, March 29, 2000, President Kocharian 
introduced the approaches of Armenia in details:  
 
In our opinion the future collective security system is destined to be effective if it will 
truly have comprehensive features. That should be a kind of system that does not deny 
involvement of any State having a direct influence on the Region. From this standpoint 
the "3+3+2" formula has been offered implying three South Caucasus countries, the 
neighboring countries: Russia, Turkey, Iran, as well as the European Community and 
the United States.  
 
[Two paragraphs omitted: on the peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict and the 
dialogue of the Armenian and Azeri Presidents, and importance of democratic Russia’s 
involvement into stabilization process in the South Caucasus.]  
 
Thus, summarizing the foresaid, today we can already describe the main contours of the 
future system destined to establish durable stability in the South Caucasus and 
contribute to its far-reaching development. The system should include first of all 
complex of economic cooperation issues and interactions within the process of 
economic transformations. Secondly, the principles of the democratic values’ 
commonness and reforms towards it should be substantially reinforced. Thirdly, the 
processes of conflict and confrontation resolution within the Region should be 
consolidated through the mechanisms of complex and all-encompassing security 
measures. 
 
Afterwards, the official Yerevan supported the Russian initiative of the "Caucasus 
Four". However, considering the statements of Armenian high-ranking politicians, 
Yerevan has not abandoned its initiative, which implied the possibility of future 
conversion of the "Four" into more inclusive and comprehensive format.  
 
Approaches of Azerbaijan  
 
President Aliev also expressed the idea of the Pact in his speech delivered at the OSCE 
Istanbul summit in November 1999, but neither at that time nor in future Azerbaijani 
diplomats took steps towards its realization.  
 
Promptly responding to the Armenian initiative articulated in the Georgian Parliament 
the Azeri Foreign Minister Guliev interpreted the approach of President Kocharyan as 
an "Armenian-centered".  
 
Afterwards, the official Baku was continuously acting solely as a responder, always 
rejecting any proposals coming from Yerevan and developing the idea of "anti-Russian 
orientation" repeatedly appearing in the Western press. However, President Aliev didn’t 
resist and agreed to participate in the meeting of the "Caucasus Four" in Moscow, June 
2000.  
 
Approaches of Georgia  
 
In 1996 President Shevardnadze announced the initiative for "Peaceful Caucasus" 
undertaking responsibilities inapplicable for Georgia. It was the consequent of global 
approaches of the former Soviet Foreign Minister was not doable in the terms of less 
than 1.5-2 years later of the brokered cease-fires in the South Caucasus.  
 
From the end of 1999 Georgia embarked on an evasive policy, stating its willingness to 
support all the initiatives, but not taking a definite position on a possible system of 
cooperation and stability in the South Caucasus region. Overusing Shevardnadze’s 
international reputation of Perestroyka’s Foreign Minister, the official Tbilisi has 
continued to solicit foreign aid, which was substantiated by a necessity of assistance to 
the withdrawal of the Russian military bases and was spiced by declarations of the 
"Atlantic, i.e., anti-Russian orientation" easily comprehended by the western mass-
media.  
 
Simultaneously, President Shevardnadze participated in the meeting of the "Caucasus 
Four" in Moscow, June 2000.  
 
 
Approaches of Russia  
 
Subsequent to the President Kocharian’s speech delivered in Tbilisi, the official 
Moscow adhered to a position that may be described as disapproving and intolerable. 
Nobody publicly opposed to it, there were just some references to the "Kislovodsk 
process" with its 3+1(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia) formula.  
 
It seems that the Moscow’s standpoint was articulated in the article signed by the 
President of North Ossetia-Alania Aleksandr Dzasokhov (Nesavisimaya Gazeta, April 
7, 2000), which was an indirect semiofficial reply to the President Kocharyan’s speech 
in Tbilisi. The initiatives taken were simply qualified as anti-Russian, and the 
instigations of the South Caucasus leaders were elucidated by malevolence or naivety. 
The 4+2 formula was suggested (Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia + Iran, Turkey 
as a "second echelon"). In fact it was a suggestion to leave out the European Union and 
the USA.  
 
Nevertheless, Moscow went beyond of the references to the "Kislovodsk process" and 
took political measures trying to give birth to the initiative of the "Caucasus Four", and 
organized the Kocharyan-Aliev-Shevardnadze-Putin meeting in Moscow, June 2000.  
 
 
Approaches of Turkey  
 
At the beginning of 2000 Turkish President Demirel also put forward the initiative of 
the Caucasus Stability Pact underlining the 3+2+2 formula (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia + Turkey, Russia + European Union and USA). The system proposed should 
have been formed in the framework of the OSCE thus excluding such an important 
actor as Iran is, and minimizing including the role of Russia in it.  
 
Subsequent to President Demirel’s fulfillment of the tenure in office, the official Ankara 
was demonstrating an underlined cool approach towards this initiative, which absolutely 
has not reflected its policy in the South Caucasus (excluding Armenia) and Central 
Asia.  
 
 
Approaches of Iran  
 
Iran has also showed interest towards the Stability Pact initiatives, particularly 
considering conferences devoted to the Caucasus and Central Asia held in Tehran since 
the end of 1999. Representatives of governmental circles, as well as academicians and 
NGOs were invited to participate in those Summits. Taking into account the nature of 
the political regime in Iran, it may be unambiguously considered as an interest, hence 
the common belief, that Iran is isolated in this matter, is unreasonable.  
 
Nevertheless, as in the others, as well as in this case Tehran is acting as a alarming 
opponent of the U.S., whose penetration into the region is declared as an undesirable. 
The existing status quo in the Caucasus with the emphasized influence of Russia is 
satisfactory for Iranians from two main standpoints: their ensured presence in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia and their ensured role in the discussions on Caspian Sea 
legal status. These inclinations have perhaps internal political reasoning too, as 
reportedly there are some disagreements between "reformers" and "conservatives" over 
the tactics of anti-American Policy. Meanwhile, it is possible, that the religious ties 
connecting the ethnical groups within this state will be severed, as a result of political 
winds blowing from the Caucasus.  
 
 
Approaches of the European Union  
 
None of the influential Powers within European Union has demonstrated any definite 
disposition yet. The only exception is the statement of the German Foreign Minister 
Fisher on July 4, 2000 referring to the necessity of the Stability Pact for the South 
Caucasus. It is remarkable that it was released by Reuters with reference to the CEPS 
project; therefore, it may be interpreted as a basis for discussing this actor’s approaches.  
 
The CEPS project is similar to the Armenian version regarding the number of 
participants, but there is a structural difference. The Troyka of South Caucasus 
Dimension is complemented with the Troyka of Northern Dimension with the 
leadership of EU and Russia and the USA following them on. The formula is closed up 
by Southern Dimension, that is represented by neighboring Iran and Turkey. From the 
beginning of the process corresponding measures should be taken to establish a Black 
Sea-Caucasus-Caspian Sea Stability zone.  
 
The mission of the Northern Dimension Actors is the assistance to the Parties and 
leadership for the regional conflicts’ comprehensive resolution. It would mean 
establishment of a proper modus vivendi in the region, carried out by the Powers and 
directed to legitimization and harmonization of the interests. The CEPS proposal hinted 
at this end, but did not elaborate it. However, there is no any - besides of slogans - 
device in it to stimulate actors involved in to transform their policies from the national 
interests’ paradigm typical for the 19th century into the integration tendencies 
characteristic for the 21st century.  
 
 
Project comprises a valuable clause due to which the short-term preference first of all is 
given to the security arrangements. Secondly, it is aimed at the economic integration of 
the South Caucasus nations, with a long-term aim of the joining to the European 
political standards and, maybe, institutions. Nevertheless, the document is rather scarce 
from the standpoint of the military-political guarantees as distinct from the very well 
developed (upon European models) clauses of regional cooperation and the government 
decentralization (particularly, for Nagorno Karabakh and Abkhazian conflicts 
resolution). The project without detailing supposes accomplishment of security 
measures within OSCE framework, thus automatically leaving out Iran.  
 
 
Approaches of the USA  
 
Since the end of 1999 none of the U.S. high-ranking politicians has demonstrated 
disposition towards the possibility of establishment of the comprehensive stability 
system for the Caucasus. The Washington acted in the favor of the regional conflicts’ 
prompt resolution and strengthening of the Newly Independent States of the region, 
particularly trough considerable financial support and elaboration of the alternative 
export roots for the Caspian vast hydrocarbon resources.  
 
Voluntarily or not, the United States took on the leadership in the post-Cold War world 
assuming numerous responsibilities on global and regional levels. The Caucasus region 
also didn’t slip the attention of Washington: in the middle of 1990’s President Clinton 
declared it a "zone of the U.S. vital interests".  
 
For comprehension of the USA inclinations it is indispensable to be aware of the certain 
limits in the stand taken by Washington. The USA is striving to push forward its 
interests and interests of its allies, thus restricting the monopolistic influence of Russia. 
As a proof can serve the leading role of Armenia and Georgia in the amount of aid per 
capita provided by the USA, as well as affected participation of the Clinton’s 
administration in the oil programs. Simultaneously, it should be mentioned that at least 
in this stage it is the utmost involvement into the regional affaires, when undertaking of 
any security commitment is excluded. However, the presidential elections in 2000 and 
the anticipated alteration of the administration in 2001 may give rise to considerable 
changes to the approaches of Washington.  
 
Moreover, Nagorno Karabakh peace process shows that Washington will never 
challenge Moscow, using the OSCE Minsk group as a venue for creating an illusion of 
cooperation and softening the atmosphere of contradictions in the other domains 
(particularly in the sphere of strategic balance).  
 
Though the opposition of Iran against the USA is obvious, the South Caucasus is 
considered to be a floor for possible cooperation too. The U.S. State Secretary Albright 
in her speech delivered during the session of the American-Iranian Council in the 
school of Foreign Service of Georgetown University, March 17, 2000, pointed out the 
"encouragement of stable relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan" as "one of the 
common interests [of the USA and Iran]".  
 
 
Approaches of the other Powers  
 
Among the actors having their interests in this Region first of all should be mentioned 
the main powers of the Southern and Eastern Asia, i.e. India, Japan and China.  
 
India and Japan avoid showing an apparent positions towards the South Caucasian 
conflicts. By the same token, rapidly growing Japanese economy, as well as India with 
its constantly increasing population should attempt to ensure their entrance into the 
Caspian-Central Asian region, as well as take the opportunity of consuming its vast 
energy resources. For both of them this zone is more available (in the sense of the 
space), then the Persian Gulf or the other significant regions famous with their 
hydrocarbon reserves (in the case of Japan with the exclusion of Siberia).  
 
The case of China is different: over 1 billion population, needs of the growing 
economy, contiguity of the Central Asia, as well as ambiguous cooperative-competitive 
triangular relations with Russia and the USA are the factors, that unavoidably bring the 
interests of the Beijing to the Southern regions of the former USSR.  
 
Moreover, in the first half of 2000 the shift of the Chinese interests in the Caucasus has 
been outlined. The Chinese Foreign Ministry strongly condemned the Parliamentary 
elections of 2000 in Nagorny Karabakh, the Speaker of the Chinese Parliament Li Pen 
paid an offical visit to Baku, and the issue of the construction of Kars-Tbilisi railway 
was discussed during the bilateral negotiations conducted in the framework of the 
official visit of the President of China Jan Zemin to Turkey (as reported by Hyuriet 
April 20, 2000). Would it be possible, it will diminish and alienate the strategic 
importance of Kars-Gyumri railway and blockade of Armenia will assume a character 
of absolute regional isolation.  
 
* * * 
 
The main obstacle for the South Caucasus integration is not the lack of historical 
experience, but it’s strongly negative nature. For centuries the region has been a 
territory of ongoing contentions between the Powers, such as Iran and 
Rome/Byzantium, Byzantium and Arabic Caliphate, Iran and Ottoman Empire with 
intervention of Russia promptly extruding Iran. During the whole 19th century the 
Eastern Question had been performed on the political stage as the problem of Ottoman 
Empire, the Sick man of Europe with the Russian Empire striving to expand to the 
South, also through the Caucasus. In this environment all the common structures in the 
Caucasus have been enforced being established under external pressure with absolute 
neglect of the local actors.  
 
The Office of the Caucasus Viceroy (end of 18th – 19th centuries) was determined to 
spread the Russian predominance in the Region and expand its borders to the South. 
Following the World War I and two Russian revolutions of 1917 the misgoverning 
structures of OZAKOM, Trans-Caucasus Special committee (March-November 1917), 
Trans-Caucasus Commisariat (November 1917-March 1918) and Trans-Caucasus Seym 
(February-March) had led to the declaration of the independence of Trans-Caucasus in 
April 1918 and created favorable conditions for the break-up of Russian Empire and the 
collapse of the World War I Russian-Turkish front-line. The first Republics of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia declared in May 1918 were similarly ineffective.  
 
The Soviet Union formed in the 20th century created a new state ideology, being based 
on the interests of the Worldwide Revolution instead of the concept of interests of a 
Monarch and/or a Nation. But the declared "honest" aims and their fierce nature did not 
result in alterations of the imperialist means, but brought to their unfair and brutal 
consumption.  
 
The essence of the Trans-Caucasus Soviet Republics’ Federation of 1922-1937 reminds 
the Caucasus viceroy’s mission. But the issue of national self-consciousness was a 
serious hindrance even for the creators and servants of the totalitarian system. During 
15 years of its existence the Trans-Caucasus Federation carried out its mission in the 
South Caucasus to establish a totalitarian Communist system, gradually reinforcing the 
pressure from NEP to the Collectivization and Industrialization. According to the 
principle "divide and rule" the Soviet Socialistic Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia were formed with a strongly limited educational-cultural self-government and 
explosive administrative borders. The system being formed the Trans-Caucasus 
Federation means faced no considerable changes and lasted till the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  
 
With the end of the Cold War the bipolar system of the International stability falled 
down, as the Communist system accepted its weakness and defeat as a result of 
Perestroyka. Nevertheless, denouncement of the Warsaw Pact didn’t cause NATO 
destruction, but, on the contrary, convinced its members in absolute fairness of their 
inclinations.  
 
Today, in the contrary to the 40 years subsequent to the World War II, it seems that the 
representatives of two camps have traded their places. Finlandization (a geopolitical 
term that formulate the influence of a stronger Power on the neighboring countries, 
formed through the use of indirect means; based on the experience of the Soviet-Finland 
relationships) always being considered as a headache for the Atlantic strategists, today, 
is a hindrance for the Russian military’s Chiefs-of-Stuff.  
 
NATO-ization of the post-Communist Central Europe from the middle of the 90’s has a 
nonreversible nature, instead of the Finlandization previously suggested by Moscow. 
NATO Partnership for Peace Program and active engagement of the NATO countries in 
the processes going on in Ukraine and other post-Soviet Newly Independent States, 
create favorable conditions for Finlandization of the so-called "Near Abroad" of Russia. 
That in turn causes the jealousy of Moscow with an alarming awareness of threat to an 
unidentified post-Imperial interests.  
 
In these conditions the declarations of the Azerbaijani and Georgian leaders about their 
willingness to join NATO will never get direct positive response from Brusseles, 
simultaneously being encouraged by other means. Thus, Finlandization of the South 
Caucasus will turn to be the zone of possible agreement, which the Atlantic allies will 
try to sell Moscow as the best solution through reciprocal concession.  
 
Today the three South Caucasus States (despite their capabilities) are entering into a 
game, the other participants of which have disproportionate excess of any resources. 
The slogans of transformation of the 19th century’s Realpolitik into the 21st century of 
integration are not enough for hammering out the deal. Only in conditions of the 
formulated political will of the South Caucasus Nations and joint kind of coercive 
actions of the actors having considerable influence in the Region it may be possible to 
engender a stability system, even though there are suspicions considering its efficiency.  
 
Such a mission can be accomplished only by the Powers of Northern Dimension, i.e., 
Russia, EU and the U.S. creating a particular modus vivendi for the Region ("rationale 
balance of trade-offs and pay-off" - as it is in the CEPS proposal).  
 
The deal in the Caucasus may be accomplished provided that EU and the U.S. accept 
Russian absolute military-political predominance in the South Caucasus. They will be 
offered an opportunity to participate in the exploitation of the Caspian-Central Asian 
natural resources through investments. It may comprise elements of a geopolitical 
condominium assuming limited participation of the Atlantic allies. Certainly, in this 
case all the talks over Finlandization will be meaningless.  
 
The attempt of the Stability Pact for the Balkans in 1999, signed during Eosovo crisis, 
was bound by predominance of NATO through military-political intervention during 
collapse of Yugoslavia in the 90’s, is a real proof of this version. But, as we have 
already mentioned reviewing the U.S. approaches, not only the United States’, but as 
well as the European Union engagement in the South Caucasus is restricted. The 
sensible evaluation shows that those Powers are not ready to apply to the Balkans 
scenarios in the South Caucasus in either positive or negative terms.  
 
In this debates on macro-political level upon the South Caucasus region (we may also 
remember the vocabulary of the 19th century – in the Great Game played by the Great 
Powers for the Heartland of the Central Asia) the Russian peacekeeping forces in 
Bosnia and Kosovo, limited in number and placed under the command of NATO, could 
be considered as a useful analogue, that allows to assume the possibility of a contrary 
scenario in this region. It means, that by the precedent the possibility of NATO’s 
restricted positive involvement in the Caucasus may not be excluded. Here also all the 
actors will encounter a new obstacle: will that mean in reality the legitimization of 
Turkish intentions of military presence in the Region through NATO, which in its turn 
will naturally cause objections from Armenia and Russia?  
 
Meanwhile, the scenario of reestablishment of the Russian absolute superiority in the 
region is strongly undesirable for two other actors of the Northern Dimension. It is 
available only in case of intense tension of the regional situation, but not in the 
conditions of the conflicts management in the terms of ceasefire, that all-in-all 
corresponds to the interests of EU and USA).  
 
In the beginning of 1990’s the South Caucasus nations entered into the international 
politics as a Balkanized region of infinite fragmentation into independent and quasi-
independent centers of power hostile to each other. It was immediately interpreted from 
the standpoint of "Moscow’s hand" not wanting to lose its influence in the Region. 
However, it should be mentioned, that the endeavors of international community to 
localize and to manage through the cease-fire regimes the complicated conflicts in 
Nagorno Karabakh and Abkhazia, Russia has played a leading and a decisive role. In 
the second half of the 1990’s a fragile balance of power in the region had been 
achieved.  
 
All the debates upon Nation-building in the post-Soviet multi-ethnic Balkanized region 
carry a formal character. The best proof of it is the history of the South Caucasus Newly 
Independent States for the last ten years. Here is another scenario might be considered 
which may be called a Geopolitical nightmare.  
 
For people searching Caucasus on the World map and discussing its problems with that 
kind of expertise the level of the current situation of conflict management should be 
observed as a line beyond of which there won’t be a regional fragmentation. But the 
Caucasus peoples’ local-communal thinking and the severe social conditions create a 
basis for internal instability that may be consequently turned into serious conflicts, as it 
was in Tajikistan. The regional disintegration would change its character from 
Balkanization to Lebanonization equivalent to the fighting between uncountable and 
uncontrolled units.  
 
In this regard the situation in Georgia is highly explosive, as there are several regions 
difficultly controlled by the government. The agreement coined during the OSCE 
Istanbul Summit on the withdrawal of the Russian military bases from Georgia due in 
2000-2001, thus reducing Moscow’s influence in the region, will be the best conducive 
to the aforementioned scenario. Reestablishment of the Tbilisi’s sovereignty on a part of 
the Georgian territory is indeed a positive attempt, but there are negative consequences 
that shouldn’t be neglected. It may give rise to unmanageable developments not only in 
such regions of military bases’ allocation as Javakhq and Ajaria are, which will be 
afterwards deprived of considerable financial means, but as well as in such regions hard 
to govern as Megrelia and Svanetia are, where the amount of weapons in turnover is 
rather large.  
 
Unmanageable crisis caused by the collapse of the central government may be the 
context for the intervention of the democratic Russia, possessing on the U.N. or OSCE 
mandate, as the sole power able to control and stabilize this "wild" region. To prevent 
the developments by this scenario (as the events of 1994-95 showed Azerbaijan, and 
even ethnically the most unified Armenia might face this challenge) the effective 
implementation of economic and social reforms has a prior significance. It is necessary 
to ensure the controlled supply of supportive financial means from donors and through 
it the three South Caucasus countries’ equal encouragement.  
 
All the arguments listed above prove, that in discussions over the Caucasus Stability 
Pact initiatives every party will strive to protect its own interests even discounting other 
actors. Azeri Foreign Minister’s "Armenian-centered" appraisal of the proposal made 
from Yerevan is unique by its straightforwardness, and may be an exceptional indicator 
of NIS’s external-political roams and hesitations.  
 
It fist of all means pushing away the unpredictable zones of instability by all means, 
even at the expense of others’ interests. Moscow has adopted an approach towards 
Caucasus similar the model of the U.S.-Caribbean relationships and considering the 
Region as a zone of its own exceptional interests, more precisely, sphere of influence 
(Yalta, 1945 Style).  
With predominance of such egocentric attitudes, Armenian security concerns about 
Turkey would get a secondary importance, transforming the region into a Cordon 
Sanitaire preventing any move towards the Russian South. Thus, the sovereignty of the 
three South Caucasus nations would be diminished to the buffer states status, when 
freedom of their actions will become the direct function of their powerful neighbor’s 
security requirements’.  
 
In this regard in the proposals forwarded by CEPS and others, the problems of Southern 
Dimension are insufficient. If in case of Turkey it is possible to anticipate a positive 
attitude to the European integration mechanisms, then the approaches of Iran may be 
observed as unpredictable. The obstacles are not only of a psychological and value 
nature. The Turkish Kurdistan is the region bordering the South Caucasus, zone of 
guerilla war for the last 20 years, where dominates strictly different from Istanbul and 
Ankara environment of human rights protection. The second region is the Iranian 
Azerbaijan, which is currently rather stable being under the power of Islamic autocracy, 
but at any moment may be turned into a Turkic "gunpowder barrel" that has been ruled 
by the Iranian minority.  
 
From the standpoint of Armenia (Azerbaijan should have the similar concerns) the most 
undesired thing is the possibility to develop any military-political system between the 
region and the neighboring countries only in the OSCE framework. This will ensure 
withdrawal of Iran from the process, as well as Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s attachment 
to the OSCE common frontier becoming a hard burden for both nations.  
 
With this regard the perspectives of Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian Sea-Central Asia 
cooperation axis development will be highly encouraged. Creation of an independent 
military-political stability system, similar to the CFE Treaty, conducted within the 
OSCE framework, will be in the scope of both Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s interests.  
 
The global concerns on the Caucasus stability pact projects are not less important. The 
Northern Dimension of European Union-Russia-USA suggested by CEPS would be 
able to undertake a leading role not only through appropriating their value systems (it 
was somehow carried out during the late 1980’s and 1990’s through OSCE and EAPC), 
but also reaching to an agreement on their visions of global developments.  
 
During the Cold War the Chinese ideologists forwarded the Rich North versus Poor 
South Confrontation concept, due to which the main conflicts should be expected on 
that allotment. Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian Sea-Central Asia linkage is a possible 
transition zone, the last component of which is rich with natural resources, therefore it’s 
desirable for everyone. It’s also a factor encouraging development of tension. As the 
history of the 20th century shows, strive for possessing natural resources played a 
decisive role in the process of causing the both of World Wars.  
 
In these terms development of integration processes both horizontally and vertically 
gets prior significance for the Northern Dimension. Russia, European Union and USA 
have ambitions typical for Superpowers, but they are not equivalent to their real 
capacities, particularly in case of Russia.  
 
Developments of 1990’s prove that only USA could paralleled improve not only the 
vertical but the horizontal integration tendencies as well. It was also proved by NAFTA 
(North American Free Trade Agreement) and Washington’s undertakings in South 
American direction. In case of European Union, regardless the integration experience, 
disagreements, sprung out from the Nation-state classic ideology, have such a profound 
nature, that prevented from settlement of the crisis causing Yugoslavia collapse, and the 
formal development projects of Mediterranean cooperation restricted the ambitions 
towards the South.  
 
Conclusion  
 
 
The 1990’s for the South Caucasus nations were gained with an exceptional opportunity 
of regenerating of their countries. As for them and as well as for the other actors 
creation of a regional stability and security comprehensive system is the imperative of 
our days. But the geopolitical matters, value systems and mismatch of different interests 
within the region and around it are serious obstacles for expansion and development of 
this kind of initiatives.  
 
The large-scale discussion of Stability Pact idea itself can smooth the unhealthy 
environment within the region and serve as a unique protection for withstanding new 
crises. It can also foster development of such a comprehension that will strengthen the 
stability and control of the existing confrontations in the South Caucasus.  
 
Nevertheless, this positive influence may be considered as the most available in the 
current situation. The geopolitical analysis of the current situation brings to a 
conclusion that in conditions of opposition and interests’ mismatch, ceasefire and 
management of the existing conflicts may be regarded as the main goal of the South 
Caucasus Nations in the first decade of the 21st century.  
 
